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Both physically and narratively, Moby Dick’s body dwarfs all others in the 
eponymous novel by Melville, as the author devotes inordinate space to dissecting and 
explicating a whale’s physical presence. Yet he explores other bodies too. In “The 
Tattooed Treatise: Breaking Down Mind/Body Binaries in Moby-Dick” I focus on human 
bodies, arguing that Melville used Queequeg, Ishmael and Ahab to contest contemporary 
bodily theories. From Calvinism and Transcendentalism to phrenology and Abolitionism, 
Melville was surrounded by discourses that competed in asserting the body’s relationship 
to the mind. 
By describing Queequeg’s tattoos as a “complete theory,” a “mystical treatise,” 
and a “wondrous work in one volume,” Ishmael explicitly textualizes the harpooner’s 
body and dissolves the traditional opposition between body and mind; the body retains 
the mind’s knowledge and the mind requires the body to convey its wisdom. This 
cohesive mind/body relationship directly opposes a separatist discourse like Melville’s 
childhood Calvinism. Ahab’s body is also unified with his mind, yet with starkly 
unharmonious implications: his severed leg scarred not only his body, but also his mind, 
leading the captain ultimately to calculated murder-suicide. 
Using modern race and gender theory to interpret Melville’s mind/body binaries, I 
argue that Ishmael struggles to choose between his allegiance to Ahab’s corruption or 
Queequeg’s harmony by developing awareness of his own body’s performative nature. 
By textualizing his body with tattooed whale measurements (and leaving room for a
poem), Ishmael makes the body’s fluid relationship with the mind explicit, asserting his 
allegiance not only to Queequeg’s mind/body harmony but also to his body’s 
performative possibilities. Melville thus dramatizes a model of mind/body unity that was 
decidedly radical for his contemporary sphere of ideas, and which remains so today. 
 
GUY-MCALPIN, CHARLES T., M.A. Poetic Minds in Cloddish Soil: Hawthorne’s 
Bodies in Contemporary Discourse (2009) 
Directed by Dr. Karen Kilcup. 30 pp. 
“Each stroke of the hoe was to uncover some aromatic root of wisdom”: 
Nathaniel Hawthorne thus establishes the Transcendentalist dream in The Blithedale 
Romance through his protagonist and narrator, Miles Coverdale. Coverdale’s personal 
journey begins with youthful idealism but ends with wounded skepticism. In “Poetic 
Minds in Cloddish Soil: Hawthorne’s Bodies in Contemporary Discourse,” I analyze 
Hawthorne’s rejection of Transcendentalism in Blithedale through the lens of the 
mind/body binary, arguing that his romance undermines the tenability of this 
philosophical model. 
Most modern scholars analyze bodies with reference to race, gender, and 
sexuality. In Hawthorne studies these readings usually focus on The Scarlet Letter, 
particularly on Hester’s desexualized body, implicit slave narratives of subjugation, and 
Chillingworth’s “raping” of Dimmesdale. Rather than contesting these theoretical 
perspectives, I suggest that their prominence causes us to systematically overlook other 
textualized bodily discourses. In Blithedale, Hawthorne critiques Emersonian 
Transcendentalism by interrogating the body’s relationship to the mind. 
When Coverdale says that his labor will unearth truth, he connects his body’s toil 
to the mind’s capacity for knowledge, clearly channeling Emerson; Transcendentalism 
depends on the possibility of poetic unity between body and mind. Coverdale aspires to 
this unity, but soon realizes its philosophical flaw: as he works harder and harder, his 
ability and desire to write and contemplate decreases, foreclosing a utopian access to
poetics and Nature. Hawthorne’s interrogation of Transcendentalism is not limited to 
Coverdale. By exploring certain synecdochal images in other characters, particularly 
Westervelt’s teeth and Zenobia’s flowers, I show how Hawthorne repeatedly establishes 
mind/body binaries throughout the text while undermining their idyllic, transcendental 
possibilities.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
The following two papers explore the relationship between body and mind as they 
are constructed in nineteenth-century American literature. The first paper examines this 
mind/body binary through the lens of Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick, while the second 
focuses on Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Blithedale Romance and Scarlet Letter.  
 
 
 
2 
THE TATTOOED TREATISE:  
BREAKING DOWN MIND/BODY BINARIES IN MOBY-DICK 
 
Thanks to Tommo's primal fear of tattoos in Typee, the practice of body-
modification has enjoyed a sustained conversation in Melville scholarship. The 
discussion is necessarily tinged, though, with an emphasis on tattoos as a site of violence 
to both the body and identity, thanks to Tommo's reactionary anxieties. But this 
antagonistic emphasis belies the alternative image that Melville offers through Queequeg 
in Moby-Dick. In this novel, the white protagonist overcomes his repulsion and becomes 
Queequeg's fast friend. Far less recognized, though, is the fact that Ishmael appropriates 
Queequeg's practice by tattooing whale measurements onto his arm. Melville shifts his 
emphasis, and tattoos transform from agent of violence to transmitter of knowledge. This 
alternate discourse allows a reading that focuses explicitly on the mind’s 
interconnectedness with the body. 
Melville famously describes Queequeg’s tattoos as a “complete theory of the 
heavens and the earth,” although no one can understand the language (366). The interplay 
between tattoos and language taps into an argument over the binary opposition between 
body and mind that is prevalent in both Melville’s culture and our own. I contend that 
Queequeg’s tattoos function as a response to the dominant bodily discourses of Melville’s 
time, including Calvinism, Transcendentalism, and phrenology and race; and that modern 
gender and race theorists like Judith Butler and Hortense Spillers offer unique insights 
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into these contemporary ideas because of their emphases on bodily performance. 
Queequeg’s tattoos explicitly perform the mind’s relationship with the body. 
The significance of Queequeg and Ishmael’s tattoos requires some framing. Thus, 
I will begin with scholarly and historical context to justify this discussion of the body, 
followed by a look at Ahab, whose maimed body figures most prominently in the novel 
(at least among the humans). The discussion then moves to Queequeg and Ishmael, 
utilizing modern gender and race theory’s attention to bodily discourses to explore the 
implications of these performances. 
Scholars tend to focus their interests in the body on Typee; for example, Geoffrey 
Sanborn’s Riverside edition offers a critical section on the practice of tattooing, wherein 
Nicholas Thomas describes tattooing as “violence to the body” (356). His description is 
literal as well as metaphorical, for the implementation required hammer and sharp bone 
dipped in ink. Tommo is “Horrified at the bare thought of being rendered hideous for 
life,” and his overwhelming fear colors the readings of modern scholarship (206).1
                                                 
1 See also Otter, Wardrop, and Orr. 
 
Ishmael’s friendship with Queequeg and subsequent willingness to tattoo himself freely 
is all the more remarkable in light of Typee. The most extensive research on the body in 
Melville scholarship appears in Samuel Otter’s Melville’s Anatomies. Otter deftly weaves 
together multiple cultural moments, from cannibalism to craniology to landscape 
paintings, in order to contextualize Melville’s mission to represent the bodies of both 
humans and whales. While Otter’s study reads the meanings of bodies, I am pivoting to a 
study that explicitly addresses the body’s binary relationship with the mind.  
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Melville establishes linked mind/body constructions throughout Moby-Dick. 
Queequeg’s tomahawk pipe had “both brained his foes and soothed his soul” (92); 
Ahab’s “soul” is “shut up in the caved trunk of his body” (131); and Ishmael believes that 
a “fasting body makes the body cave in; hence the spirit caves in; and all thoughts born of 
a fast must necessarily be half-starved” (82). The different word choices of “mind,” 
“soul” and “spirit” should not distract from the fact that all function as counterpoints to 
the body. The categories all break down to a distinction between internal and external—
abstract essence versus worldly matter. 
By repeatedly emphasizing this binary opposition, Melville confronts competing 
philosophical and religious discourses that attempt to define the binary in mutually 
exclusive ways. The Calvinism of Melville’s childhood emphasized death, damnation and 
original sin, treating the worldly life of the body as entrenched in carnal fallibility. 
Salvation was only possible by divorcing the redeemable inner self from the carnal outer 
self.2 Transcendentalists (evolving from the Unitarian tradition) argued the opposing 
view that people were rational beings who could choose to better themselves and that evil 
was an overstated force in the world. Transcendentalists like Emerson were relatively 
uninterested in the body, while Whitman reveled in the oneness between mind and body. 
The differential emphasis from Calvinism, however, makes clear that for 
Transcendentalists the body and mind were idealistically unified, not tragically divided.3
                                                 
2 For a recent discussion on Melville and Calvinism, see Emory Elliott’s “’Wandering To-and-
Fro’: Melville and Religion”; T. Walter Herbert, Jr.’s Moby-Dick and Calvinism: A World 
Dismantled, while older, offers more extensive analysis. 
 
3 See McLoughlin and Williams. 
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Melville’s interest in and dissatisfaction with both sides of this debate appears 
explicitly in Moby-Dick: though technically a Quaker, Ahab clearly succumbs to the 
bleakest overtones of Calvinist fire and brimstone as he drives his crew toward 
destruction; and the novel’s pervasive themes of death, terror and insanity resist 
Transcendentalist notions that life could ever be serene. Indeed, Emory Elliot argues that 
Melville critiques most religions and philosophies for empowering men like Ahab who 
believe they have special access to knowledge of good and evil and thus special privilege 
to act as they please (191). In contrast, Melville’s experiences among non-white 
populations in his travels informs his distaste for transcendental idealism. His years in the 
diverse whaling populations inspired his harsh criticism of racist agendas throughout his 
body of work, which led him to anticipate McLoughlin’s assessment of Emerson’s 
Transcendentalism: “Although [Emerson’s] Over-Soul theory is based on the natural 
divinity of all people, […] in actuality it becomes apparent that he is really only applying 
his theories to a small, elect group” (31). Here McLoughlin’s critique focuses on the 
marginalized lower classes of American society, yet for a man like Melville who is 
concerned with translating the humanity of other peoples to an American readership that 
still recognizes the legality of human property, cynicism toward Emerson’s infinite 
progress would have seemed doubly naïve. 
In the face of what one might call Emersonian elitism, Melville crafted Queequeg. 
The harpooner is neither white nor American, and ironically was interested in profiting 
from Western knowledge but gave it up when he realized “that even Christians could be 
both miserable and wicked” (60). Queequeg stands on the fulcrum between Ahab and 
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Ishmael. An impressionable young fellow, Ishmael is drawn to Ahab’s monomanical 
power. Ahab’s fury, though, is rooted in a highly divided mind and body, which threatens 
self-destruction. On the other hand, Queequeg harmoniously resolves the mind and body, 
disrupting the binary that commonly separates them.4
The key word for Ahab is monomania, Melville’s favorite descriptor for the 
captain. Although one might casually unpack this phrase to mean singularly crazy, it 
more accurately signifies “an exaggerated or fanatical enthusiasm for or devotion to one 
subject” (OED). It would be superficial to say that Ahab directs his monomaniac 
 We will begin by considering Ahab 
in order to establish the dangers of a highly polarized mind/body schema, thus further 
emphasizing what Queequeg’s synthetic perspective offers. 
 
“The Tormented Spirit that Glared Out of Bodily Eyes”: Ahab 
In his analysis of Melville’s connection to Emerson, John Williams observes, “In 
no other character has Melville dramatized so completely what Emerson called the 
‘divided state’ of man when out of harmony with the forces that created him” (21). 
McLoughlin reads Melville as more critical of Emerson; at one point McLoughlin argues 
that Emerson believed “evil does not exist,” and later highlighting the evil ramifications 
of Ahab’s “defective human will” (32; 73). Both critics note the frantic discontinuity 
inherent in Ahab’s character—a discontinuity that we can fruitfully analyze along the 
mind/body binary. 
                                                 
4 This “harmony” is not to be confused with the pastoral idealism of Whitman’s poetry, for 
Melville carefully tests Queequeg’s mind/body against the harsh realities of a brutal whaling 
world. Indeed, Ishmael does not reveal the full import of Queequeg’s tattoos until the harpooner 
prepares his coffin. 
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obsession at the one Moby Dick, for a closer look reveals the true object of obsession to 
be himself. Ahab’s neurotic obsession with the whale thinly veils his “extreme doubt 
concerning the nature of [his] own identity” (Williams 63). Ahab, in other words, 
externalizes the rage rooted in his maimed body, which then becomes his maimed 
identity, onto the external whale. Perhaps here we should introduce Butler, for she argues 
in Gender Trouble that “‘[i]nner’ and ‘outer’ make sense only with reference to a 
mediating boundary that strives for stability” (170).5
What is this body’s relation to power? Rosemarie Garland Thomson argues that 
disability is characterized as “lack, loss, or exclusionary difference for which 
compensation is needed to achieve the equality justice promises” (106). Ahab’s claim to 
power represents his need for normalcy—to recuperate the ever-evasive source of his 
former wholeness. Ahab must compensate for the castration of his body (an obvious 
enough image when Ahab’s broken whale leg nearly pierces his groin in “Ahab’s Leg”) 
by redistributing emphasis away from his body and onto his vengeance-seeking intellect. 
But in favoring the mind at the expense of the body, Ahab negates the idealistic 
 By redirecting the object of his rage 
from his maimed body to his maiming assailant, Ahab stabilizes his identity, reinventing 
himself as a man capable of agency and power. In light of this disabled identity, Ahab’s 
will to power offers a dramatic representation of Butler’s assertion that bodies only hold 
meaning “in the context of power relations” (117). Ahab’s power stems from the apparent 
inferiority of his body and yet proceeds from his rejection of that body. 
                                                 
5 One must of course be careful when reinscribing theories of gender to a more generalized 
reading of “identity.” However, my attention to the body maintains the relative intent of 
Butler’s argument by emphasizing the body as the site of identity’s cultural performance. 
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possibilities of Emerson’s reason-based philosophy, as Melville clearly shows: “He piled 
upon the whale’s white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his whole 
race from Adam down, and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart’s 
shell upon it” (156). The unquenchable violence in Ahab’s soul works against Emerson’s 
claim in “The Transcendentalist” that “there is no crime but has sometimes been a virtue” 
(Myerson 370). When inequality, injustice, and violence are figured into accounts of the 
body, Transcendental concepts of the mind suddenly seem inadequate. 
Ahab, then, epitomizes egocentrism. He pursues the whale to satiate his suicidal 
blood-lust, uninterested in the safety and profits of everyone else on the ship—
“coercively regarding them as projections of his own will,” as Louise Barnett puts it 
(114). This egocentric “will” equates to a total preference for the mind in the mind/body 
binary, and fittingly, Ahab’s monomania manifests itself in overtly mind/body terms. 
Ahab’s first encounter with Moby Dick ends with the whale biting off his leg. Ishmael 
conjectures that Ahab’s madness developed during his sedentary months of recovery: 
“then it was, that his torn body and gashed soul bled into one another; and so interfusing, 
made him mad” (156, emphasis added).  In one decisive motion Melville interrogates 
both Calvinism and Transcendentalism: Calvinism, because the corrupt mind becomes 
synonymous with the corrupt body, and Transcendentalism, because this supposed 
harmony between mind and body offers no hope for a brighter future. Instead, Ahab’s 
violated body bleeds into his tortured mind, positing a horrifying and disabling unity. 
While Whitman’s Leaves of Grass lines may seem similar—“if the body were not the 
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Soul, what is the soul?”—their tones differ dramatically: “The full-spread pride of man is 
calming and excellent to the soul” (19.1.8; 19.6.79). 
In negotiating these contemporary ideologies, Melville stakes out his own ground 
by positing a union between body and soul, while simultaneously disrupting the optimism 
of that relationship by melding the two in common anguish. Instead of dissolving the 
binary harmoniously, as Queequeg does, Ahab broods on his physical and mental pain, 
returning to public life with his “natural intellect” possessing “a thousand fold more 
potency than ever he had sanely brought to bear upon any one reasonable object” (157). 
Considering his emphasis on the mind’s intellect, Ahab rejects the body, locus of maimed 
defeat, and bends his entire being to his mind’s cunning so that he may find Moby Dick 
and inflict his revenge. 
Ahab’s singular craziness suggests that a division between mind and body is 
unhealthy. Indeed, Melville revisits this split later when Ahab bursts out of his cabin in a 
sleepwalking state. Ishmael hypothesizes that Ahab’s suppressed, “eternal, living 
principle or soul […] spontaneously sought escape” while Ahab’s monomania slumbered 
(169). Although it is tempting to digress into an id/ego reading here, we should note 
instead how the body is only a tool—the internally divided forces of good and evil duel, 
but the body remains an object of possession and thus victimization. Hortense Spillers’ 
discussion of slave persecution becomes oddly relevant for a white ship captain: 
“[slaves’] New-World, diasporic plight marked a theft of the body—a willful and violent 
[…] severing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire” (457). Ahab’s 
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monomaniac mind besieged his body so that he could satisfy his suicidal lust for revenge, 
which ends in the body’s desecration. 
Ahab’s ironic victimization is made possible by the dual forces of disability and 
Calvinism. “Representation tends to objectify disabled characters by denying them any 
opportunity for subjectivity or agency,” Garland-Thomson argues (11). Although Ahab 
certainly enacts a powerful force of agency, that agency clearly registers as an 
overcompensation against the emasculating and disabling effects of his injury. Ahab 
effects this shift from mind to body by redeploying his identity as a Calvinist one. 
Marianne Noble calls attention to this dichotomy when describing the Calvinist distrust 
of “the body and the feelings as sites of corruption and confusion” (62). Ahab’s disability 
made his body’s corruption readily apparent, thus initiating his rejection of that body. 
Melville makes clear that Ahab’s insanity stems from the schism between his 
mind and body, and that his mind’s total domination results, necessarily, in his body’s 
subjugation and victimization. But in the mind/body context, Melville establishes Ishmael 
as Ahab’s antithesis, providing one more answer to the oft-asked question, Why does 
Ishmael survive? Otter’s praise of Melville’s cetology chapters makes the answer 
evident: “It is about the epic poetics of the body. It is not about the gap between 
expendable surface and philosophical depth but about how bodies became saturated with 
meaning” (133). In the course of the novel Ishmael learns from Queequeg just how 
meaningful the body can be. 
Thus far, this argument has focused on Ahab to call attention to the mind/body 
binary; Melville takes an even greater step, though, by constructing scenes where key 
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characters explicitly perform the meaning-saturated body that Otter describes. Even while 
Ahab splits mind from body, he undermines the move with a textual gesture: every day 
Ahab marks his navigational measurements onto his ivory leg (127). This image signals 
the interconnectedness between mind and body even as Ahab refuses such a concept; 
Queequeg and Ishmael posit the opposite model, and all three characterizations fall 
within the paradigm of bodily inscription. 
 
“We cannibals must help these Christians”: Queequeg and Ishmael 
Ishmael begins the novel in gloom: “With a philosophical flourish Cato throws 
himself upon his sword; I quietly take to the ship” (18). Much like Ahab, Ishmael looks 
to the ocean for death and glory. Before setting sail, he again voices his death-drive while 
sitting in a chapel and pondering over the empty tombs of sailors killed at sea: “Methinks 
my body is but the lees of my better being. In fact take my body who will, take it I say, it 
is not me” (45). He argues that his body is irrelevant to his identity, and specifically that 
his body only represents a sedimentation of his true, internal self.6
                                                 
6 “Sediment” is the OED’s explanation of the word “lees.” The word refers to the non-liquid 
material that settles in beer or wine, and thus carries the unsavory connotation of “dregs.” 
 Resonating with 
Ishmael’s phrasing of the sediment, Butler’s own argument resonates with Ishmael’s 
phrasing, with the same word choice, although divested of Ishmael’s faith in an 
autonomous identity: “But the more mundane reproduction of gendered identity takes 
place through the various ways in which bodies are acted in relationship to the deeply 
entrenched or sedimented expectations of gendered existence” (Performative Acts 524). 
Butler argues the body reflects the sedimentation of identity, which is itself a sediment of 
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social norms. Ishmael believes at this early stage in the novel that his identity has an 
essentialist coherence, but still concludes that his body merely reflects that identity, 
without being invested with any inherent meaning. This framework of the body partially 
anticipates Butler’s argument that bodily significance derives more from identitarian 
politics than inherent bodily meaning. 
Unfortunately, Ishmael’s Calvinist bent leads him to the conclusion that death 
would be inconsequential, perhaps preferable, in light of this distinction. But the 
connection to Butler makes clear that Ishmael’s fatalism should be fundamentally 
understood as an anxiety over the relationship between mind and body, particularly when 
the binary is understood through the discourse of Calvinism, which, when one is suicidal, 
seems to encourage a view of the body, and by extension the corporeal world, as 
expendable. Textually speaking, Ishmael parallels Ahab by shunning the mind’s 
dependence on the body and seeking death; there are ruinous implications for both 
characters when the mind subjugates the body. 
But thanks to Queequeg, Ishmael does not die; he even clings to life while his 
entire crew perishes around him. Much scholarship has been devoted to the significance 
of this union. “Ishmael makes himself over in Queequeg’s image,” while the latter 
propels Ishmael into “a different order of experience” (Elmore 87; Sanborn 248). 
Queequeg’s sense of calm stimulates “healing and rescue and […] Ishmael’s survival” 
(Flory 97). Suffice it to say that while Ahab’s decline begins when his leg is divorced 
from its body, Ishmael’s recovery begins when he marries Queequeg. 
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While we can bracket off the fact of Queequeg’s influence on Ishmael, as it is 
well established in current scholarship, we do need to examine what it is about the 
harpooner that transforms him. Ishmael first warms up to Queequeg upon observing that 
the islander was “thrown among people as strange to him as though he were in the planet 
Jupiter; and yet he seemed entirely at his ease; preserving the utmost serenity; content 
with his own companionship; always equal to himself” (50). Most dramatically in the last 
phrase, Ishmael’s language emphasizes an attraction to harmony. In the reflexive “equal 
to himself,” Melville conveys that Queequeg’s mind is in harmony with his body. We 
need only look at Ishmael’s next revelation to underscore this claim: “I felt a melting in 
me. No more my splintered heart and maddened hand were turned against the wolfish 
world. This soothing savage had redeemed it” (51). Melville’s parallel between Ahab and 
Ishmael waxes and wanes here, for while Ahab allows his torn body and gashed soul to 
corrupt one another, Ishmael dissolves the splintered internal and maddened external into 
the soothing example of Queequeg. Body and mind melt together, establishing harmony. 
I want to take a moment to defend against the notion that this harmony mirrors the 
idealism of Whitman. It is true that Queequeg represents a sort of ideal figure: princely 
native from a mythic isle, fully unified in marked contrast to the puritan American states. 
Yet the fact remains that Queequeg dies, along with the entire crew (Ishmael excepted). 
Queequeg’s body represents harmony, but that harmony that works against an often-evil 
universe. The intent of Whitman’s verse, particularly “I Sing the Body Electric,” is to 
“strip significance strategically from the human body and restore an innocent wonder to 
its contemplation” (Otter 112). While my use of “harmony” may be tinged with a bit of a 
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soft filter, Queequeg’s character is emphatically not stripping significance away from the 
body, but is in fact performing the opposite move by calling attention to the body in a 
mode of contemplation that is bereft of innocence. Ishmael explains Queequeg’s body 
while the man is emaciated and dying and the entire crew careens toward doom; thus, the 
entire framework of this discussion is necessarily foregrounded by the character of the 
text as tragic.  
Queequeg’s influence on Ishmael may directly relate to harmony between mind 
and body, but what good is a harmony based on racial subjugation? After all, Melville’s 
emphasis on Queequeg’s body, simplicity, total good will towards white men, and even 
noble lineage all raise concerns over racial stereotyping and subjugation. Based on the 
changes Geoffrey Sanborn discovered between Melville’s source text for Queequeg and 
Melville’s own version, Sanborn argues convincingly that Melville actively rejected an 
imperialist view of native people.7
                                                 
7 “The three most important changes are that Queequeg comes from an imaginary island, 
Kokovoko, rather than from New Zealand; that he changes his mind about “civilizing” his 
island; and that he saves a stranger, rather than his bosom friend, from drowning” (Sanborn 
230). 
 We see this anticolonial move most clearly when 
Queequeg explains his presence in the West: 
 
he was actuated by a profound desire to learn among the Christians, the arts 
whereby to make his people still happier than they were; and more than that, still 
better than they were. But, alas! the practices of whalemen soon convinced him 
that even Christians could be both miserable and wicked; infinitely more so, than 
all his father’s heathens […] Thought he, it’s a wicked world in all meridians; I’ll 
die a pagan. (59-60) 
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Queequeg travels the world in search of spiritual improvements for his people, but 
ultimately concludes that his people are better off without Western influence. Although 
one need not feel totally comfortable with Melville’s portrayal of Queequeg as an exotic, 
disposable benefactor of Ishmael’s coherent identity, the corpus of Melville’s work 
indicates that he sought to offer as much humanity to non-whites as to whites in his 
characterizations.8
Strictly speaking, the mind/body harmony that Ishmael learns from Queequeg is 
entirely reflective; my evidence has focused completely on Ishmael’s interpretation of 
Queequeg’s behavior, not on any explicit gesture Queequeg makes to assert this harmony 
in his own philosophy. But in the post-structuralist landscape, what could Queequeg 
possibly utter through the narration of Ishmael’s speech that would hold any more 
validity than Ishmael’s own narrated thoughts? His power over the narrative objectifies 
Queequeg’s agency in a way that their friendship cannot unmake. Deconstruction thus 
plagues us with “undecidability” (Spillers 455). For Butler the problem is to represent 
women politically without essentializing them—to speak about women while refusing the 
sedimented category of woman. Melville’s problem is to provide Queequeg with agency 
unmediated by Ishmael’s narrative voice. Spillers articulates a similar need, to represent 
“ethnic” people in a way that steps outside of the colonial patriarchal discourse, by 
focusing on the body. In discussing the body’s non-linguistic utterances—as opposed to 
Butler’s contention in Bodies that Matter that bodily significance is always 
 
                                                 
8 Typee and Benito Cerino are good examples. Although laced with somewhat disturbingly racist 
language, the texts overtly call imperialism and slavery into question. See Marr. 
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predetermined by discourse—Spillers offers a more fruitful paradigm by which to read 
Queequeg’s bodily insciptions. 
Spillers argues that slave injustice is mapped onto the flesh of the body, which 
bears evidence of slaves’ incessant torture and serves as a ”primary narrative” (457): 
“These undecipherable markings on the captive body render a kind of hieroglyphics of 
the flesh” (458). Her premise—that a slave’s bodily mutilation functions as a non-
linguistic narrative on race—can inform a reading of Queequeg, for he bears his own set 
of undecipherable hieroglyphics of the flesh. Queequeg’s tattoos serve the same purpose 
as Spillers’ mutilations, bearing “the marks of a cultural text whose inside has been 
turned outside” (458). But in her world that text is one of ripped flesh—mental pain 
mapped onto the body. On Queequeg, prince of a fictitious island that is safe from 
colonization, Melville reappropriates the bodily text to represent a peaceful harmony with 
the mind.9
                                                 
9 There is of course a tension here between Butler and Spillers. Butler refuses to acknowledge 
that the body contains any signifying power that is not mediated by language: “Is there a 
physical body prior to the perceptually perceived body? An impossible question to decide” 
(Gender Trouble 146). But Spillers pushes back, arguing that “The flesh is the concentration of 
‘ethnicity’ that contemporary critical discourses neither acknowledge nor discourse away” 
(458). Spillers bolsters her contention against post-structuralist feminism by channeling Elaine 
Scarry who, in The Body in Pain, argues that “Physical pain does not simply resist language but 
actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the 
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned” (4). For Scarry and Spillers, 
flesh embodies an access to experience that operates outside the unifying construct of language. 
I choose to negotiate these conflicting perspectives by focusing on Spillers’ framing of her 
discourse as a search for “figurative possibility” to gain the “potential for gender 
differentiation” (455). This is not back-peddling on Spillers’ part, but rather an appeal to read 
what the bodily text offers without dismissing it as a construct of language, even if we can only 
understand that text through language. Spillers does not really contradict Butler, but rather 
resists Butler’s agenda to pull the discourse of gender away from the identitarian body, where it 
has remained historically entrenched. Taken together the two theorists offer, fittingly enough, a 
reading that balances the power of the mind with that of the body. 
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Melville links Queequeg’s tattoos to his identity, as is evident when Queequeg 
copies down a mark from his arm as signature for the whaling expedition (85). But that is 
weak material compared to what Melville has in store. As Queequeg prepares for death 
he inscribes his tattoos onto the wood of his coffin, at which point Ishmael reveals their 
full import: 
 
And this tattooing, had been the work of a departed prophet and seer of his island, 
who, by those hieroglyphic marks, had written out on his body a complete theory 
of the heavens and the earth, and a mystical treatise on the art of attaining truth; 
so that Queequeg in his own proper person was a riddle to unfold; a wondrous 
work in one volume; but whose mysteries not even himself could read, though his 
own live heart beat against them. (366-7) 
 
Knowledge has literally been inscribed onto Queequeg’s body, which Melville explicitly 
describes as a text. Melville underscores the internal/external dichotomy when he 
describes the heart beating against the flesh. Mind and body are thus fused into a 
cohesive whole where the body retains the knowledge of the mind’s domain, and the 
mind requires the body to transmit its knowledge. 
Yet Queequeg’s bodily signs are unreadable—both to him and everyone else. 
They contain knowledge, but they do not transmit knowledge. This very unreadability 
permits a Derridian reading, for the tattoos represent signified knowledge but cannot be 
mistaken for an essential signifier—they contain knowledge but that knowledge cannot 
be reinscribed. The tattoos make deconstruction explicit, forcing us to acknowledge that 
any significance we glean from the tattoos can only be a significance of our own 
devising. In turn, the body balances the mind’s significance by appropriating its signs as 
tattooed knowledge. But the body holds those signs on its own terms; it does not 
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retransmit them through language. I indulge in this splash of structuralist theory because 
it shows how Melville has diffused the mind/body binary. His depiction demands a 
reading of the body and mind as interconnected, and yet tattoos do not make this reading 
inevitable. If the treatise were readable, translatable, identity would simply shift from the 
mind to the body. But by making the tattoos meaningful yet unreadable, he bleeds the 
binary in upon itself while maintaining an uncomfortable and irresolvable fluidity 
between the two spheres of agency, thus ensuring that neither holds power over the other. 
The resulting lack of boundaries unsettles what Toni Morrison characterizes as early 
America’s obsession with order and hierarchy (37-38). 
As with all objects of deconstructed meaning, Queequeg’s body causes anxiety 
for those who want the body’s identity to remain stable, and freedom for those who seek 
new modes of knowledge. To Otter the overall thesis of Melville’s “corporeal chapters” 
is that “the body is a book of secrets, waiting to be read by the observer”; he adds, “[t]he 
inscrutable things are what Ahab hates, the things that resist searching examination” 
(135-36). Although he refers to cetology here, the analysis clearly carries over to 
Queequeg’s body.10
                                                 
10 Otter draws upon extensive research into physiognomy and craniology to argue that Melville’s 
contemporaries, epitomized by “The American School” of scientists, were keenly interested in 
discovering how one could read the body. 
 
 This flesh epitomizes an inscrutable book of secrets, so it should 
come as no surprise that Ahab reacts to Queequeg’s hieroglyphic body with such rage, 
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shouting, “Oh, devilish tantalization of the Gods!” (367). In his extreme mind/body split, 
Ahab despises this elusive knowledge that is mapped out on Queequeg’s flesh.11
As a barely-capable white sailor with neither grand lineage nor noble bravado, 
Ishmael cannot hope to make a gesture such as Queequeg’s. He cannot map a non-
linguistic treatise upon his body (who would write it?); he cannot defy colonialism by his 
very existence (who would care?). He can only hope to embody some gesture that bears 
 
Ahab’s verbal lash at Queequeg brings us back to Spillers. This ego-driven fiend 
despises his bodily markings for the inaccessible truths they contain. For in the history of 
selfish, violent males of the mid-nineteenth century, bodily markings are “specifically 
externalized acts of torture and prostration that we imagine as the peculiar province of 
male brutality” (Spillers 458). Bodily markings that do not reflect torture, that in fact 
posit superiority over this dominant white male, necessarily incite rage. Queequeg thus 
offers modern readers an idealized response to Spillers. Although his triumph is only 
fictitiously possible, it is triumph nonetheless. For Spillers, bodily hieroglyphics 
represent rape and torture, “an interiorized violation of body and mind” (458), and the 
desecrated bodies reflect a desecrated mind. But Queequeg’s character posits the 
opposite; his bodily hieroglyphics assert strength and soothing harmony with the mind. 
As a final flourish, they enrage the dominant class. 
 
“[I] wished the other parts of my body to remain a blank page for a poem I was then 
composing”: Ishmael 
                                                 
11 Otter discusses Ahab’s outburst by focusing more on the body’s significance, whereas I wish to 
connect that body to its polarized other (164) 
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the trace of Queequeg’s harmonious presence. Ishmael accomplishes that feat by 
tattooing knowledge, specifically the measurements of a whale, onto his own body: “The 
skeleton dimensions I shall now proceed to set down are copied verbatim from my right 
arm, where I had them tattooed” (346). Ishmael thus completes the triumvirate of 
inscriptions: Ahab marking latitudes on his whale-bone leg, Queequeg’s tattooed treatise, 
and now Ishmael’s whale-measurement tattoos. Ishmael’s tattoos are not hieroglyphic; 
they do not challenge Derridian linguistics, but they do bear the trace of Queequeg’s 
more profound mind/body performance—they explicitly perform the mind’s connection 
to the body by imprinting knowledge on the flesh. To borrow from Margaret Homans’ 
work in another context, he “is defending not the body alone, but the inseparability of 
body and mind, against a philosophical tradition that depends on a mind-body split” 
(80).12
When discussing Queequeg’s body, it seemed logical to focus on Spillers’ 
argument—the primary narratives of race and body required it. But Ishmael’s tattooing 
gesture, his performance as I have cast it, offers the opportunity to reintegrate Butler into 
the argument. It would be disingenuous to claim that Ishmael’s feeble numerical tattoos 
contain the same level of importance as Queequeg’s richly textual body. Yet this 
feebleness also offers realism, allowing us to step off the mythically pristine island of 
Queequeg’s birth (and thus the mythic origin of his tattoos) and onto the dry ground (or 
dry planks) of nineteenth-century America. And it is in this more realistic context that we 
 
                                                 
12 Homans is speaking about Joyce A. Joyce’s objection to black critics’ willingness to adopt 
post-structuralist theory, which amounts to an “elitist ‘rejection of race’” (79). The argument 
thus mirrors the tension between Butler and Spillers. 
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can read Ishmael’s tattoos as performing the same function as Butler’s conception of drag 
performance. 
In Gender Trouble, Butler agrees with feminists who critique drag as creating a 
“unified picture of ‘woman,’” but argues that drag goes further by simultaneously 
exposing the falsely naturalized unity of heterosexual coherence: “In imitating gender, 
drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency” 
(175 author’s emphasis). In essence, drag questions the coherence of the gender binary by 
convincingly performing its opposite. If a man can perform woman better than woman 
can, then what claims to validity does gender contain? Melville’s homoerotic 
construction of the “marriage” between Ishmael and Queequeg establishes a similarly 
fluid conception of heteronormativity. But more abstractly, Ishmael’s tattoos perform the 
same function. By mapping out knowledge onto the body, Ishmael subverts the notion 
that the internal and external are irrefutably distinct. By imprinting knowledge onto the 
body, Ishmael performs the body’s opposite, thus parodying the very notion of its binary 
opposition. 
Of course drag theory seems out of place, not least because it is shamelessly 
anachronistic. But what is drag’s function? Drag subverts cultural norms that necessarily 
exclude and persecute those who cannot or will not comply. Melville’s career was 
founded on this desire to push back against Western hegemony: “he began to see his 
‘civilization’ as highly limited in its range of ideas and possibilities regarding every 
aspect of life and culture” (Elliot 176). Melville’s project, as I have argued throughout, 
has been to complicate the binary discourses of contemporary America, particularly 
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discourses on the nature of the body and its relationship to the mind. Since Ishmael 
figures his radical act as an act of the body, it makes perfect sense to read that as a drag 
performance. Butler herself says, with no reference to gender, what drag works against: 
“What constitutes through division the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds of the subject is a 
border and boundary tenuously maintained for the purposes of social regulation and 
control” (170). This control of inner/outer is precisely what Ishmael opposes, which we 
see clearly when he famously, and somewhat ridiculously, revels in the glory of 
squeezing spermaceti: “Come: let us squeeze hands all round; nay, let us all squeeze 
ourselves into each other; let us squeeze ourselves universally into the very milk and 
sperm of kindness” (323). Ishmael’s foray into this ecstatic transcendental moment of 
worldly unity, comical though it may be, proves that he has lost interest in binary 
thinking. 
This notion of drag is not as ahistorical as it may seem. Phrenologists were 
essentially trying to make the reverse assertion; as Otter argues throughout Melville’s 
Anatomies, the pseudo-scientists of “the American school” were centrally concerned with 
proving that the outside represented the inside: “Melville’s uneasiness about tattooing [in 
Typee] reflects with a vengeance American obsessions with making the surface of the 
body speak eloquently of inherent human existence” (10). The ethnological conceit of the 
day, then, was to read the internal mind/body/soul through the lens of the external body. 
This central anxiety prefaces Tommo’s fear of tattooing as a fear of having one’s white 
civilized identity tarnished by the indelible mark of the Other. But Ishmael overcomes 
this fear that engulfs Tommo, making friends with the “savage,” even “marrying” him, 
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and even tattooing himself voluntarily. Ishmael’s tattoos represent a profound rejection of 
the ethnological conceit that so overwhelms Tommo. But one can reject this ethnology in 
numerous ways: by demanding the two spheres of mind and body are distinct, as a 
Calvinist might prefer, or that the rational mind supersedes the corporeal body, as an 
Emersonian might protest. Instead, Ishmael goes radical by reversing the claim—by 
imprinting a piece of his mind onto his body. He thus posits a body whose identity is in 
flux—a body that can represent the mind, as phrenologists desire, but only because the 
mind contingently imprinted itself onto the body. This cyclical exercise calls the entire 
phrenological conceit into question. 
Butler prefaces her section on gender performativity with a question: “How does a 
body figure on its surface the very invisibility of its hidden depth?” (171). Of course she 
argues that the figured body is gender identity—suggesting an essentialized internal 
identity with a rhetorical wink—and that the function of drag is to continuously rehearse 
the fictitious cultural norm by performing its opposite. But in the mind/body binary, 
Ishmael’s tattoos perform the same function. Ishmael literally figures the internal onto the 
surface of the body. The effect, as I have argued, is to lock the mind and body into a 
cyclically referential continuum that calls the entire binary into doubt, just as drag 
undermines gender even as it seems to be reinscribing it. The permanency of Ishmael’s 
tattoos gestures not to the fixity of the body’s meaning, but to its perpetual threat to 
become something different. 
The very permanency of Ishmael’s tattooed performance suggests that he 
performs drag better than modern drag does. Drag works within the framework of gender 
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as “an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a 
stylized repetition of acts” (179). But the repetitive performance of gender identity also 
opens the space for that identity to fail, and change:  
 
The possibilities of gender transformation are to be found precisely in the 
arbitrary relation between such acts [of gender continuity], in the possibility of a 
failure to repeat, a de-formity, or a parodic repetition that exposes the 
phantasmatic effect of abiding identity as a politically tenuous construction. (179)  
 
Ishmael’s tattoos call attention to this arbitrariness of identity as it is delineated between 
internal and external, and the permanency of his act—that very permanency that Tommo 
feared—ensures that his bodily parody will repeat perpetually and without interruption. 
By indelibly refiguring the mundane surface of his body, Ishmael ironically undermines 
the “illusion of an abiding […] self” (Butler 179). 
Ishmael began the novel as a man who was so entrenched in Western conceptions 
of the self that he literally did not care if his body were destroyed because he had so 
much faith in the unilateral primacy of his internal essence. But, as Stubb argues within 
our paradigm, “I’ve part changed my flesh since that time, why not my mind?” (384). 
Ishmael literally changes his flesh, and this alteration reflects a revitalized desire to live, 
which his squeezing-spermacetti scene clearly shows. Since Ishmael learned that desire 
from Queequeg, a desire he explicitly understands as predicated on mind/body harmony, 
he adopts the tattooing practice to stylistically repeat that harmony. 
But why does it matter that we understand this harmony in terms of drag? 
Ishmael’s early state of mind was not only significant because of how it reflected an 
essentialist conception of identity, but because of how it aligned him with the suicidal 
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vengeance of Ahab’s Calvinism. Although Ishmael opens himself up to a new subjective 
position by the end of the novel, Ahab cannot break free from his monomania. Some of 
Ahab’s final words staunchly reassert the primacy of his will, and they register to the 
reader as a fatal error that foreshadows the tragedy to come: “Nor white whale, nor man, 
nor fiend, can so much as graze old Ahab in his own proper and inaccessible being” 
(417, emphasis added). And within a few lines, Ahab maintains his position that this 
untouchable essence of self not only bears no relation to his body, but is diametrically 
opposed to its feebleness: “Accursed fate! That the unconquerable captain in the soul 
should have such a craven mate! [Starbuck expresses confusion] My body, man, not 
thee” (417-18). This division is what Ishmael’s character works against. Through 
Ishmael, Melville offers a conception of the mind as interconnected with the body, which 
opens up a new space for concepts of identity that are not confined by the polarizing 
norms of contemporary America.  
While Queequeg represents the ideal, Melville positions Ishmael more in reality. 
A lonely, depressed man, Ishmael began his journey sharing Ahab’s bifurcated mind and 
body. And just as with Ahab, the implications were disastrous. But in the idyllically 
unified character of Queequeg, Ishmael finds a different model to pursue, one that 
emphasizes harmony between the mind and body in direct contrast to contemporary 
thought. And while Ishmael’s whale-measurement tattoos may not be the most 
hieroglyphic, he seems to have the right idea in mind, for he has saved room on the rest 
of his body for “a poem [he] was then composing” (451). In constructing the body as an 
ever-changing text, Melville seeks to unify body and mind, which speaks directly to his 
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contemporary sphere of ideas and anticipates modern gender and race theorists. In 
Melville’s fiction, to insist that the body and mind remain distinct means reinforcing 
Ahab’s claim to power. But by granting signifying power to the body as a site of 
knowledge, Melville offers a way out of the normalizing systems that allow Ahab to lead 
his crew to destruction.
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POETIC MINDS IN CLODDISH SOIL: 
HAWTHORNE’S BODIES IN CONTEMPORARY DISCOURSE 
 
Contemporary criticism has made it seem irresponsible to theorize the body 
without regard for race, gender or sexuality. Discussions of Queequeg’s bodily 
inscriptions in Moby-Dick must consider the racialized body on which they are imprinted, 
and Ishamel’s relationship to Queequeg requires some attention to the homoerotics, if not 
homosexuality, of their explicitly marital relationship. The issue is even more 
pronounced in Hawthorne studies, with the classic Scarlet Letter earning a steady flow of 
criticism on such subjects as Hester’s desexualized body and Chillingworth’s “raping” of 
Dimmesdale. Of course “the body” enjoys critical capital today because of race and 
gender theory’s interest in it as a doorway into suppressed or ignored narratives. Race, 
gender, and sexuality should not be abandoned as objects of inquiry, but the dominance 
of these theoretical lenses causes us to systemically overlook other neglected 
representations of the body. 
This essay will show how Hawthorne’s bodies critique transcendental idealism 
and cultural essentialism. My reading is very much grounded in performativity, but 
foregrounded by an explicit interest in exploring the ramifications of these performances 
in non-gendered terms. While The Scarlet Letter is usually the principal text for these 
debates over the body in Hawthorne studies, I will focus primarily on The Blithedale 
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Romance. Although issues of the body are more pronounced in the former, in the latter 
Hawthorne more explicitly connects the mind/body binary to contemporary discourses—
in this case Transcendentalism. Hawthorne and his contemporaries understood the mind 
and body as complementary parts of the Self. Although his framework is amenable to 
race and gender theory, I will instead discuss Hawthorne’s depictions of the mind and 
body in light of his socio-cultural context. In Blithedale, Hawthorne appropriates 
Transcendentalist notions of mind/body unity and uses those terms to disrupt the 
philosophy’s idealistic potential. In The Scarlet Letter, which usefully bookends this 
discussion of Blithedale, he dramatizes competing cultural gazes to reveal the 
impermanent, performative nature of bodies. 
 
The Scarlet Letter 
Given The Scarlet Letter’s abundant bodily emphases, the most enticing scene for 
critics is usually Chillingworth’s “rape” of Dimmesdale. Readers will recall how 
Chillingworth exposes Dimmesdale’s sleeping body to discover the ambiguously defined 
“A” upon his breast: “The physician advanced directly in front of his patient, laid his 
hand upon his bosom, and thrust aside the vestment, that, hitherto, had always covered it 
even from the professional eye” (121). Readings of this scene tend to capitalize on 
erotically charged words like “thrust,” “shuddered,” “rapture” and “ecstasy” to elaborate 
on the homoerotic or homosexual dimensions of their relationship, culminating in this 
moment of symbolic rape. Scott Derrick, for example, uses the rape to discuss 
homophobia in nineteenth-century America, figuring the two men’s relationship in 
explicitly homosexual terms. Karen Kilcup more persuasively analyzes the scene in 
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homoerotic terms, complexly interweaving relationships between body and text, author 
and reader, and interiority versus exteriority. 
Kilcup’s argument helps clarify my position. She argues that the narrative 
“apparently attempts to read the text via the body, and ends up reading the body itself as 
text” (6, author’s emphasis). She then comments on the homoerotic dimensions of the 
inward and outward manifestations of Dimmesdale’s guilt, describing them as “the 
story’s hidden substantive sexual excess, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the text” (7). Kilcup’s 
analytical strategy clarifies the opening that this paper will exploit. She claims that 
Dimmesdale’s body acts as a text, and then reads that text through a homoerotic lens. 
Although this is precisely her intention, the maneuver deemphasizes the overt dialogue 
within the text between the body’s relationship with the mind and the ramifications of 
Dimmesdale’s exposure. The pages leading up to Dimmesdale’s violation by 
Chillingworth are filled with references to this binary, as when Chillingworth asserts that 
“a sickness, a sore place, if we may so call it, in your spirit, hath immediately its 
appropriate manifestation in your bodily frame” (119). By paying closer attention to the 
intratextual discussion of body and mind that Chillingworth asserts here, I will show how 
Hawthorne deploys bodies to critique contradictory societal gazes. But first I will 
establish the theoretical context for this reading practice. 
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The Blithedale Romance 
Bodily theories of gender, sexuality and race almost inevitably work within the 
mind/body paradigm because we read bodies through their relations to cognition.13
Oftentimes these “mind and body” constructions convey contemporary clichés, a 
regurgitated phrase that simply means “every aspect of myself.” But in Moby-Dick 
 Judith 
Butler’s performativity theory exploits how the interiorized demands of society (mind) 
manifest themselves in how we perceive and enact our physical bodies, and crossdressing 
makes this binary explicit, with minds choosing (in the gendered societal sense) their 
bodies. When Margaret Homans discusses “belief in the embodiedness of race and 
gender (a belief that race and gender are experienced in the body),” she calls attention to 
the mind that is doing the experiencing—an internal perspective that counterpoints the 
external body (79). By reducing these complex theories down to this simple binary, I 
simply mean to underscore a historically entrenched conception of human identity as split 
between body and mind, which emerges throughout nineteenth-century American 
writing. Thus, when Coverdale is disturbed by Zenobia’s riddles during his illness, the 
disturbance afflicts his “sensitive condition of mind and body” (35). One sees this “mind 
and body” throughout Hawthorne’s tales and novels. The phrase carries an interesting 
double significance, for it simultaneously suggests the mind and body are separate, each 
requiring its own annunciation, and yet conflated, since they are so frequently called forth 
in tandem as a single unit. 
                                                 
13 The Cambridge Companion to Nathaniel Hawthorne and Hawthorne and the Real: Bicentennial 
Essays offer many excellent race/gender/sexuality readings, particularly essays by Alison 
Easton and Nina Baym. See also Monika Elbert’s “The Surveillance of Woman’s Body in 
Hawthorne’s Short Stories.” 
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Melville drastically opened up this binary, using it to express the tensions and unities in 
characters like Ahab (his injured leg corrupts his psyche), Queequeg (his angelically 
tattooed body represents his spirituality), and of course the numerous cetological chapters 
for the whale himself. Although Hawthorne never invested his prose with such dramatic 
presence as Melville’s, he shared his friend’s interest in breaking apart cultural givens to 
test the foundations on which they rested. As with Melville, these treatments of the mind 
and body are most illuminating when we consider them in light of contemporaneous 
philosophies. For Hawthorne, particularly in Blithedale, that preoccupation was with 
Transcendentalism. 
By “contemporary philosophies,” I have a few discourses in mind: of course 
Transcendentalism, but also Calvinism, spiritualism and Unitarianism, as well as 
discourses on slavery and women’s rights. Each sphere depended on the mind and body 
to articulate its position. Calvinists understood the body as an inherently corrupt vessel 
for the soul. The internal self may be capable of salvation, but the body, with its carnal 
desires and material impermanence, can only be a hindrance. Thus the Calvinists 
emphasized bodily rejection and inward contemplation. Spiritualists were even more 
overtly concerned with the body, but contradictorily; they believed less in heaven and 
hell and more in purgatory-like ascending spheres of afterlife.14
                                                 
14 See Bret Carroll’s Spiritualism in Antebellum America. 
 Influenced by Native 
American theology, spiritualists believed that ghosts could remain on Earth, and that 
mediums could make their bodies porous to spiritual inhabitation and guidance. 
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Spiritualism was a budding sensation while Hawthorne wrote Blithedale, and the Veiled 
Lady’s mesmerism is a clear reference to spiritualist faith. 
My intention here is not to fully summarize each philosophy, but rather to 
highlight how each paradigm articulated itself in terms of the relationship between body 
and mind. Thus, Unitarians valued reason and contemplation (read mind-centric) while 
Calvinists tended to be evangelical and damnation focused, harping on the threat of 
everlasting pain (read body-centric). Transcendentalists grew out of Unitarianism, but 
posited a system that idyllically integrated the reasoning mind with the feeling body. For 
Transcendentalists, Nature provides humanity with the path to God, and Nature is best 
experienced both cognitively and viscerally. 
American Renaissance authors could not invest meaning into bodies without 
being mindful of these discourses. What Hawthorne (and Melville) so effectively exploits 
is not the contradictions between these bodily discourses but the commonalities. While 
each philosophy represented radically different ways of perceiving life and spirituality, 
they all depended on discourses that pitted mind against body, or body against mind. 
Transcendentalists worked against this duality by positing a more unified self. Yet we see 
in an essay like Emerson’s “The Poet” that the Unitarian underpinnings of 
Transcendentalism remain salient, for Emerson attempts to articulate the poet as one who 
idyllically unifies Nature with the mind by describing him as “the sayer, the namer, and 
[one who] represents beauty” (5). Although Emerson wants to cast Nature as 
spontaneously poetic, such words indicate that it is a poetics imposed on Nature by the 
poetic mind. Hawthorne’s contribution to these competing discourses would be to explore 
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the body’s relationship with the mind. By suggesting their union while denying that 
union’s utopian implications, he directly critiques Transcendentalism while indirectly 
critiquing his whole contemporary culture’s attitudes toward the binary. 
Hawthorne frequently denied his tales’ applicability to the real world, qualifying 
his prose as “Romance” to detach and universalize his themes (and to distance himself 
from those damned “scribbling women” who massively outsold him).15
Of course, race and gender are not only modern theoretical paradigms that we 
impose on the past. The abundant scholarship on Margaret Fuller, a friend of 
Concordians and a model for Zenobia in Blithedale, makes it clear that feminist issues 
 Not surprisingly, 
modern scholars tend to read these disavowals with skepticism. Although Hawthorne set 
The Scarlet Letter in an earlier era, the text’s societal and psychological themes clearly 
represent critiques of his present, and Blithedale is certainly a commentary on 
Transcendentalist idealism through the lens of his experiences at Brook Farm, a utopian 
Transcendentalist commune that Hawthorne joined for the better part of a year: 
“Hawthorne’s constant claim was that he aimed to escape that American insistence upon 
actuality, but we may have taken him too readily at his word” (Bell 17). Since Blithedale 
represents one of Hawthorne’s clearest attachments to contemporary issues, particularly 
transcendentalist philosophy, the text provides a useful source to explore the mind/body 
binary in ways that do not focus primarily on race, gender or sexuality. 
                                                 
15 Nina Baym effectively problematizes Hawthorne’s infamous outburst, or rather scholars’ 
appropriation of it, in “Again and Again, The Scribbling Women.” 
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were circulating in the period.16
Although scholars may often give Emerson too much credit as the sole voice of 
Transcendentalism, the emphasis is valid in Hawthorne’s case. Emerson was the arbiter 
of his move to Concord, and Hawthorne harbored complex feelings toward Emerson, 
both admiring and antagonistic. Most scholars agree that the egomaniacally visionary 
Hollingsworth was a subtle critique of Emerson. According to Larry Reynolds, 
Hawthorne’s portrayal of Hollingsworth mirrors his impression of Emerson “as an 
 Zenobia is an explicitly feminist character: “If I live 
another year, I will lift up my own voice in behalf of woman’s wider liberty!” (94). Race, 
of course, was also a significant concern in the decades leading up to the Civil War. 
Samuel Otter’s Melville Anatomies prolifically investigates racial discourses in 
antebellum America; Otter shows how a popular pseudoscience like phrenology 
attempted to rationalize racial subjugation by mapping out inferior structures of African 
skulls. It is not my intention to suggest that Hawthorne ignored these discourses (indeed, 
his denunciations of abolitionism were notorious, and his relationship with Fuller’s 
feminism was complex), but rather to suggest that they comprised only some of the many 
discourses on bodies that were prevalent in the era. Given that race and gender already 
receive such prolific critical attention today, we should remember that these are not the 
only bodily discourses circulating in Hawthorne’s time. By focusing on the 
Transcendentalist dimensions of bodies in Blithedale, I do not intend to negate racial or 
feminist readings, but rather to shift emphasis and allow for other bodily discourses to 
emerge. 
                                                 
16 For Hawthorne’s relationship with Fuller, see David Kesterson’s “Margaret Fuller on 
Hawthorne.” 
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angelic friend and a manipulative idealist, whose influence appeared chilling and often 
Satanic in its effects” (12). We might also consider that Emerson refused to join the 
transcendental community of Brook Farm because of its artificial framework; although 
Hollingsworth does join the Blithedale commune, he was just as skeptical about its 
viability. These abundant connections between the novel and Hawthorne’s own 
experience make it clear that Blithedale offered a direct critique of transcendental 
idealism, particularly Emerson’s Transcendentalism, and that Hawthorne’s insistence on 
the tale as a disconnected Romance is dubious. 
Hawthorne’s reliance on “Romance” was not only a realist evasion; we must also 
consider the more subtle benefit of the romantic strategy. By writing in this less 
“realistic” form, Hawthorne found the freedom to develop “unrealistic” scenarios that 
benefited his critique. Priscilla’s scene as the Veiled Lady would be preposterous in a 
realistic novel, but the romantic genre gives Hawthorne license, making it possible to 
dramatize Hollingsworth’s greed, subjugation of women, and ethically bereft egotism. 
Zenobia’s evolving flower ornaments transcend mere cosmetics and become “a subtle 
expression of Zenobia’s character” (33). As I will argue, Hawthorne manages time and 
again to use the tropes of romanticism to imbue bodies with potent meaning, which 
allows him to redouble his critique of Transcendentalism. 
Emerson’s “The American Scholar” remains the most iconic expression of 
Transcendentalist idealism and most clearly establishes the philosophical framework in 
which Blithedale operates: 
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The world is nothing, the man is all; in yourself is the law of all nature, and you 
know not yet how a globule of sap ascends; in yourself slumbers the whole of 
Reason; it is for you to know all, it is for you to dare all. […] We will walk on our 
own feet; we will work with our own hands; we will speak our own minds. […] A 
nation of men will for the first time exist, because each believes himself inspired 
by the Divine Soul which also inspires all men. (69-70) 
 
In this short passage we see the major themes of Transcendentalism at play, including 
self reliance, infinite progress, naturalism, and nationalism. And although Emerson’s 
words are metaphorical, he clearly emphasizes corporeal knowledge: the feet and hands 
are transcendentally glorified for their purely generative labor. He also directly connects 
these hands and feet to the mind in parallel constructions (with “we will” statements for 
all three, both divided and connected by semicolons). Emerson’s rhetorical move 
assumes a connection between body and mind that, as I have indicated, was common 
parlance. But here Emerson breaks crucially from other contemporary philosophies. 
Calvinists, for example, believed that the mind/body dichotomy sharply divided the 
internal self that is redeemable before God, from the body, which is the seat of carnal sin 
and the catalyst for all filthy desires. For Calvinists, then, “mind and body” connotes the 
the self’s two halves while underscoring their division. But Emerson rhetorically 
connects the body to the mind, positing them as two elements of a whole that must 
integrate to achieve divine unity. In “The Poet” Emerson says, “Words are also actions, 
and actions are a kind of words” (6). When we speak of transcendental unity we are 
implicitly speaking of a unified self, and this passage reveals how Emerson conceives of 
that self as a harmony between body and mind. 
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Emerson’s address resonates throughout The Blithedale Romance. Hawthorne 
structures the plot around a socialist commune where high and low-class citizens all work 
together in perfect harmony to provide nourishment for both their bodies and souls. When 
Zenobia, the fiercely independent benefactor and organizer of the commune, expresses 
her fear that Coverdale (the protagonist and narrator) will cast off his poetry (mind) for 
his new life of toil (body), he attempts to assuage her fears by romanticizing the 
forthcoming labors:  
 
I hope, on the contrary, now to produce something that shall really deserve to be 
called poetry,— true, strong, natural, and sweet, as is the life which we are going 
to lead,— something that shall have the notes of wild birds twittering through it, 
or a strain like the wind anthems in the woods, as the case may be. (8) 
 
Emerson’s philosophy resonates through Coverdale’s speech. The exertions of his 
coming exercise are tempered only by its natural harmony with Nature. Life becomes art 
when one grasps it firmly and confidently. The transcendental unity between body and 
mind also emerges here, with the body’s toil spontaneously and simultaneously enacting 
the purest of art forms. Coverdale makes this connection even more explicit later: “Each 
stroke of the hoe was to uncover some aromatic root of wisdom” (49). Hawthorne 
astutely links the minds and bodies of his characters to the philosophies and toils of their 
socialist enterprise (bodily strokes unearthing mental wisdom), thus developing 
transcendental utopianism not only as a philosophy but simultaneously as a visceral 
experience. 
Earlier I noted Coverdale’s description of his “sensitive condition of mind and 
body.” Indeed, the binary assumes primary significance during this illness, which afflicts 
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him on the first night of his arrival at Blithedale. Coverdale claims that he intuitively 
understands Zenobia more clearly while sick than he had before, and describes this 
knowledge along the mind/body spectrum: “The soul gets the better of the body, after 
wasting illness, or when a vegetable diet may have mingled too much ether in the blood. 
Vapors then rise up to the brain, and take shapes that often image falsehood, but 
sometimes truth” (34). The emphasis of this scene is on the truths, not the falsehoods. But 
regardless, Coverdale perceives mind and body as aligned on a thinly divided continuum; 
the body’s transformation directly modifies the possibilities of his internal mind, or 
soul.17
Coverdale’s illness cleanses him, both in body and mind. He comes out on the 
other side having cast off “a thousand follies, fripperies, prejudices, habits, and other 
such worldly dust” (45). Coverdale explicitly connects this mental junk to his distilled 
body: “The very substance on my bones had not been fit to live with […] In literal and 
physical sense, I was quite another man” (45). This rebirth allows Coverdale’s internal 
“spirit” to transcend his bodily “mortality” (45). My point here is not simply to hammer 
 Coverdale believes that the opposite can work as well, for earlier he claims to be 
“impressed” that his body didn’t die when he had “tolerably made up [his] mind to do it” 
(30). Not only can bodily changes determine the mind’s abilities, but Coverdale also 
believes (exactly like Queequeg, in fact) that his mind is capable of shutting the body 
down—not by refusal to eat or any such gross means, but through sheer force of will.  
                                                 
17 Although mind and soul have alternate meanings, I often conflate them in this reading because 
Hawthorne clearly juxtaposes them against the body. I am not interested in the rationalistic 
versus spiritual implications of each word, but rather in how Hawthorne uses both words to 
dichotomously counterpoint the sensory body. 
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on Coverdale’s persistent connections between body and mind, but to highlight the 
optimistic way he does it, and to tie it to his transcendental belief in the unifying potential 
of the community’s socialist project. He soon describes the commune as “an enlightened 
culture of the soil” that offers “delectable visions of the spiritualization of labor” (46; 49); 
here we should read “enlightened” as mind and “soil” as body, and “spiritualization of 
labor” as mindfulness of the body. The unifying themes between mind and body thus link 
directly to the utopian themes of Transcendentalism. Just to solidify the point, Coverdale 
spends his time in the sick bed reading, among others, Emerson. 
Of course the utopian project fails, at least in Coverdale’s eyes. Hawthorne 
arranges the novel’s structure quite simply as first half good, second half bad, with the 
straightforward chapter title “A Crisis” marking the literal and thematic center, and 
Coverdale’s claim that the community won’t seem real until someone dies representing 
clear foreshadowing and the thematic turning point. From here to the end, the novel 
deconstructs the transcendental idealism it established in the first half: relationships 
become distractions, egotism subverts socialism, and the dramas of urban society invade 
the pastoral. But when we consider the mind/body binary as a lens into Hawthorne’s 
critique of Transcendentalism, evidence of the project’s downfall begins to appear quite 
sooner—a quarter of the way in. It doesn’t take Coverdale long to crash down from his 
post-illness self-unity and begin to realize that a life of the mind and a life of the body are 
mutually exclusive. 
Immediately following his ecstatic vision of poetic labor, Coverdale admits that 
the experience was failing to actualize the ideal. But he does not belabor the point, 
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turning his attention instead to the social dynamics between Zenobia, Priscilla, 
Hollingsworth and himself; a sustained criticism of the Blithedale commune doesn’t 
emerge until the latter half of the novel. But our attention to Hawthorne’s development of 
the mind and body lends this brief scene after Coverdale’s recovery an exaggerated 
significance: 
 
The clods of earth, which we so constantly belabored and turned over and over, 
were never etherealized into thought. Our thoughts, on the contrary, were fast 
becoming cloddish. Our labor symbolized nothing, and left us mentally sluggish 
in the dusk of the evening. Intellectual activity is incompatible with any large 
amount of bodily exercise. The yeoman and the scholar […] are two distinct 
individuals, and can never be melted or welded into one substance. (49, emphasis 
added) 
 
These thoughts quickly recede beneath anxiety about Hollingsworth’s power over 
Zenobia and Priscilla, and their thematic impact is smothered by a shift in attention to 
Blithedale’s interpersonal dimensions. But seen through the mind/body lens the passage 
doubles in significance. Coverdale’s transcendental dream of a physical lifestyle imbuing 
power to the poetic mind is dashed. Not only does labor fail to enhance art, but it actively 
inhibits it. Not only does the daily toil exhaust the brain’s imaginative capacity, but 
Coverdale fails to find any symbolic significance to labor—it is merely hard work. He 
explicitly connects “clods” of earth to “cloddish” thoughts, suggesting a third strike 
against Transcendentalist notions of unity: earth is firm, stubborn and unyielding, and an 
earthly life mimics these qualities, which are antithetical to the pliable imaginativeness 
that a poet requires. 
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Significantly, Hawthorne does not discredit the idea of a union between body and 
mind, but rather the idealistic potential of that union. In essence, Emerson’s notion of 
mind/body unity still gives precedence to the mind: the poetic mind bends the body to its 
will, causing the body to experience nature poetically (although Emerson would not see it 
that way). As Emerson says in Nature, “To the body and mind which have been cramped 
by noxious work or company, nature is medicinal and restores their tone” (13). Our 
discussion of Blithedale exposes the privileged position of Emerson’s statement, which 
views corporeal experience predominantly as an antidote to mental toil. But Hawthorne 
critiques Emerson’s bias, showing how corporeal toil prohibits the mind’s ability to 
perceive nature as restorative. By appropriating the very unity between mind and body 
that Emerson asserts, Hawthorne effectively subverts Emerson’s idealism by 
complicating the nature of that unity. In light of this tactic, Emerson’s words become 
laughable: “The lover of nature is he whose inward and outward senses are still truly 
adjusted to each other” (9). Hawthorne shows how truly adjusted senses can actively 
prohibit a love of nature, for as Coverdale attunes himself to a soiled life his ability to 
poeticize Nature suffers. 
Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain addresses a similar problem. Scarry claims that 
“Physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an 
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being 
makes before language is learned” (4). Again we see the mind/body binary at play, with 
language representing the mind and pain the body. Scarry’s groundbreaking text pushes 
back against the mind-centrist lexicon, arguing for the body’s own forms of perception 
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that take precedence over those of the mind—in this case, pain.18
Returning to Blithedale, I want to underscore the significance of Hawthorne’s 
strategy. He clearly establishes a Transcendentalist ideal of mind/body unity in 
Coverdale, and then undermines it not by discrediting the notion of a unified self, but by 
complicating the utopianism of that unity. By accomplishing this critique substantially 
prior to his thematic deconstruction of Transcendentalism, Hawthorne lends extra power 
to his Transcendentalist critique. Hawthorne’s insistence on calling Blithedale a Romance 
allows him to slip this commentary in without too much attention, enshrouding it in a 
psychodrama between Coverdale and Hollingsworth (“Miles Coverdale is not in earnest, 
 Hawthorne attempts the 
same maneuver, resisting Emerson’s poeticized vision of mind/body and asserting a 
corporealized counterdiscourse. Coverdale’s daily toil certainly relates to the body’s pain; 
it is interesting to note that while Scarry maintains the mind/body binary (bodily pain 
independent of mental language), Hawthorne integrates the two, arguing not that bodily 
pain is “anterior” to the mind, but is in fact connected and capable of dominating the 
mind’s perceptive capacities. Although Thoreau spends the chapter “Reading” in Walden 
talking about the importance of literature (mind), we shouldn’t dismiss the following 
passage as quickly as Thoreau does: “Incessant labors with my hands […] made more 
study impossible. Yet I sustained myself by the prospect of such reading in the future” 
(71). Like Scarry, Thoreau wants to separate the mind and body. He talks about the 
importance of literature after admitting he couldn’t deal with literature as a farmer. 
Through Coverdale, Hawthorne exposes this blind spot in Transcendentalist theory. 
                                                 
18 See also Hortense Spillers’ “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” which reads the physical damage 
inflicted on slave bodies as a racial narrative independent of language.  
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either as a poet or a laborer,” jibes Hollingsworth) and enmeshing it in a rhetoric of mind 
and body that could be overlooked either as a standard “mind and body” trope or a 
romanticization of Coverdale’s selfhood reminiscent of Emerson’s “The Poet” (51). But 
under closer examination, Coverdale’s post-illness musings offer Hawthorne’s first 
disruption of the Transcendentalist ideal, thus establishing a paradigm for reading unified 
bodies and minds as disruptions, not reinforcements, of this Transcendentalist utopia. 
The mind/body paradigm is not confined to Coverdale; one of Hawthorne’s most 
potent realizations of his strategy appears in the characterization of Westervelt, the arbiter 
of Priscilla’s veiling and probably Zenobia’s horrid ex-husband. Also in the first half of 
the novel, Coverdale is immediately antagonistic to Westervelt, who essentially 
ambushes him during the farmer’s attempted vacation in the forest (marking another 
failure to experience nature idealistically). Coverdale offers several explanations for his 
aversion to this “disagreeable person”: he ruined his peaceful walk; his “foppish dress” 
made Coverdale self-conscious of his “homely garb”; his manner of speech was 
condescending; and more generally, Coverdale simply felt an “intuitive repugnance” (70-
72). But Coverdale cannot articulate his distrust until he makes a bodily discovery; he 
sees a gold band around the top of Westervelt’s teeth and realizes that “every one of his 
brilliant grinders and incisors was a sham”: 
 
I felt as if the whole man were a moral and physical humbug; his wonderful 
beauty of face, for aught I knew, might be removable like a mask; and, tall and 
comely as his figure looked, he was perhaps but a wizened little elf, gray and 
decrepit, with nothing genuine about him save the wicked expression if his grin. 
(73-74) 
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Once again we see a bizarre unity of self here, but one that Hawthorne strips from its 
transcendentally idealistic implications, suggesting instead the darker possibilities of such 
unity. The false teeth betray a false identity. Hawthorne calls upon the trope of the mask 
(which emerges repeatedly in his works) to dramatize the body’s ability to hide the 
contents of the mind. But the teeth are the key, unlocking for Coverdale the holistic 
meaning of Westervelt’s selfhood. 
Admittedly, the mind/body analysis gets more slippery as we shift from 
Coverdale to Westervelt. With Coverdale we had a clear, conscious investigation into the 
mind and body as transcendentally charged categories, but with Westervelt we emerge 
into the realm of subjective judgments as cosmetic tastes. And the site of this revelation 
on the face makes the issue even more complicated—if Coverdale doesn’t like the way a 
man cocks his eyebrow, is that a window into his evil soul and a denunciation of 
Transcendentalism as well? Not at all. We must remember Hawthorne’s crucial reliance 
on the term Romance, which gave him license to dramatize synecdoche: “for Hawthorne, 
the term romance, which figures so prominently in the prefaces, alerts us not simply to 
unrealistic events but also to that particular absence of realism that makes meanings 
show, often aesthetically, on its characters’ bodies” (Cameron 83).19
                                                 
19 For a more recent approach to Hawthorne’s treatment of inner and outer selves, see Joel 
Pfister’s “Hawthorne as Cultural Theorist.” 
 
 Hawthorne thus uses 
the (bodily) teeth to encapsulate Westervelt’s internal self. Considered alongside 
Coverdale, Westervelt’s false teeth undermine the utopian implications of unified selves. 
In Westervelt we clearly see such unity representing evil. 
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When we consider Coverdale and Westervelt together, it begins to seem that 
Hawthorne denounced Transcendentalism by exposing the pain and evil that bridges all 
mind/body binaries. But this conclusion is a far more gothic reading than Hawthorne 
demands. Zenobia’s symbolic identity comes, not from false teeth, but from the various 
rare flowers she wears in her hair each day. Coverdale considers their effect, concluding 
(expanding on a previously-cited passage), “The reason must have been that, whether 
intentionally on her part or not, this favorite ornament was actually a subtile expression 
of Zenobia’s character” (33). These flowers express an undoubtedly good character. 
Clearly based on Margaret Fuller, Zenobia holds Blithedale together through her 
indomitable will, intense intellect and passion for the community’s egalitarian cause.20
Zenobia’s flowers do represent transcendental unity, and neither Coverdale nor 
Zenobia nor anyone else questions this fact. Do we then finally find in Zenobia the 
 
To illuminate Cameron’s claim in the previous paragraph, we should note that Hawthorne 
downplays the importance of Zenobia’s intention in wearing these flowers, suggesting 
instead that they are a spontaneous physical embodiment of her interior self. Once again, 
Romance gives Hawthorne the freedom to establish this unity while allowing him to 
diminish the significance of a character’s intent, which would dilute his investigation into 
the mind/body relationship. 
                                                 
20 Neither Zenobia nor Fuller go uncriticized by Hawthorne. Yet it seems clear that Hawthorne 
intended his criticisms of Zenobia more to develop her character than to undermine her. He 
certainly was not interested in idealizing any of the major actors, including the narrator, and I 
read his criticisms more as a sign of respect (for here is a woman worth arguing with) than as a 
denunciation. See Lindsey Traub’s “Woman Thinking: Margaret Fuller, Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
and the American Scholar” and Nina Baym’s “Revisiting Hawthorne’s Feminism.” 
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perfect, transcendental figurehead? Certainly not, for Zenobia is the tragic figure in the 
novel, resolving the foreshadowing inherent in Coverdale’s claim that Blithedale won’t 
be real until someone dies. In life, Zenobia is the ideal Transcendentalist, but in death she 
becomes its sharpest critic without requiring a word. The power of her criticism stems 
from the relationship between her mind and body. 
Zenobia’s downfall erupts out of Hollingsworth’s betrayal. Coverdale returns to 
Blithedale toward the end of the novel to find Hollingsworth, Zenobia and Priscilla 
concluding an informal trial. Hollingsworth is the accused and his reprehensible actions 
toward Priscilla make up the case, but Zenobia is the true victim. He essentially sold 
Priscilla into slavery as the new Veiled Lady, but then repented and claimed to love her. 
Zenobia feels her own love for Hollingsworth unforgivingly betrayed, and it ruins her.21 
We cannot fail to notice that the Emerson-like Hollingsworth causes Zenobia’s downfall 
by caring only for himself and his impractical ideals; Hollingsworth denies any wrong-
doing, and Zenobia exasperatedly retorts, “‘It is all self!’ answered Zenobia with still 
intenser bitterness. ‘Nothing else; nothing but self, self, self!” (172). Hawthorne is likely 
interrogating the contradictions between Emerson’s desire for a transcendental 
community of brotherhood and his egotistical commitment to self-centered idealism.22
                                                 
21 The tension between Zenobia’s Fuller-like empowerment of women’s rights and her passivity 
in the presence of Hollingsworth’s overbearing masculinity has garnered much-deserved 
feminist attention. In addition to Traub, see also Roberta Weldon’s Hawthorne, Gender, and 
Death and Robert Levine’s “Sympathy and Reform in The Blithedale Romance.”  
 
22 See Reynolds, especially pages 11-19. 
 
But stated more simply, this scene marks the undeniable downfall of Blithedale as an 
ideologically viable Transcendentalist community. Hollingsworth’s egotism finally 
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shatters the very possibility of communalism, causing irreconcilable rifts among the 
community’s key players. Unlike Louisa May Alcott’s critique of transcendental 
utopianism in “Transcendental Wild Oats,” which mocks a group of intellectuals’ ability 
to manage and work a farm, Hawthorne ultimately rejects Transcendentalism from an 
interpersonal perspective by disavowing the possibility of harmonious and platonic social 
networks. This alternative social assault makes sense, though, when we consider 
Hawthorne’s frustrations with Emerson and other Concord Transcendentalists (including 
Fuller). 
Zenobia’s synecdochal flowers marked the one safe refuge for Transcendentalist 
self-unity in Blithedale—the one bodily image that idyllically connected to a 
Transcendentally minded character. It would seem, then, to be a strain on this thesis to 
claim that Zenobia epitomizes transcendental failure. But we should consider Zenobia’s 
final action before she descends into ruin: 
 
‘Tell [Hollingsworth] he has murdered me! Tell him that I’ll haunt him! […] And 
give him—no, give Priscilla—this!’ Thus saying, she took the jeweled flower out 
of her hair; and it struck me as the act of a queen, when worsted in a combat, 
discrowning herself, as if she found a sort of relief in abasing all her pride. (178) 
 
Considered merely in terms of plot, Zenobia’s gesture is romantic. By casting off her 
flower she casts off her identity, resigned to obscurity and death. But through our lens 
Zenobia casts off so much more, for this simple flower represented the one bodily image 
in idyllic transcendental harmony with the mind of its wearer. But Hollingsworth 
destroyed her spirit, and in casting off the flower she shows more potently than all her 
words that he has destroyed the transcendental dream along with it. 
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To solidify the death of Transcendentalism, Hawthorne kills Zenobia. Even in 
death, Hawthorne continues to connect her body and mind. Dredged from the bottom of 
the river, the men discover Zenobia’s hands “clenched in immitigable defiance” (186). 
They cannot smooth her arms down against her sides, and her clenched fists take on a 
permanence akin to Westervelt’s teeth. But this dramatic death-act merely introduces 
Hawthorne’s grand, melodramatic finale. While dragging up Zenobia’s body, 
Hollingsworth unintentionally stabs her breast: “‘You have wounded the poor thing’s 
breast,’ said [Foster] to Hollingsworth, ‘close by her heart, too!’ […] And so he had, 
indeed, both before and after death!” (186). In place of an idealized union between 
beautiful flower and beautiful soul, Hawthorne leaves us with the gothic union of a 
wounded heart, functioning simultaneously as the bodily heart and the spiritual one. How 
far we have come from the poetic ecstasy of bodily labor! 
Blithedale, as Hawthorne presents it to us, is a psychodrama. The novel’s 
dramatic thrust focuses more on unraveling social dynamics than any other theme. But a 
sharp critique of Transcendentalism bubbles under the surface, present in every page but 
never explicitly uttered. By reading bodies (and their minds) in relation to this utopian 
framework, a complex theme emerges that critiques Transcendentalism through the very 
fiber of the body, its connection to the mind, and their parallel associations with labor and 
art; both binaries are thus inextricably linked. But Hawthorne asserts through this union 
that the outcomes do not necessarily lead to enlightenment and spontaneous joy as 
Emersonian Transcendentalism would have us believe. Instead, they often cause 
frustration, doubt and pain. 
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The Scarlet Letter (continued) 
Having established this alternative interpretive lens, I would now like to return to 
The Scarlet Letter. As I suggested in the beginning of the essay, we often minimize or 
ignore intratextual theorizations of bodies in favor of our more modern approaches 
through racial, gendered or sexualized lenses.23
                                                 
23 For a lucid overview of feminist readings of The Scarlet Letter and other Hawthorne works, see 
Nina Baym’s “Revisiting Hawthorne’s Feminism.” See also Hawthorne and Women, edited by 
John Idol and Melinda Ponder. 
 What I offer here is a brief epilogue, a 
modest treatment of Coverdale’s “rape” of Dimmesdale, which has understandably 
received far more bodily analysis than Blithedale. But I hope to show how this reading of 
Blithedale opens up the possibilities of interpreting The Scarlet Letter in 
underappreciated ways. 
Hawthorne’s first commercially successful novel is quite explicitly concerned 
with physical representations of one’s internal self. Just as Westervelt had his gold-
banded teeth and Zenobia her flowers, Hester Prynne’s existence becomes synonymous 
with the “A” upon her breast. But Hawthorne’s strategy here is to express the mutability 
of the binary. Hester does not defiantly overcome the letter, nor cast it away for a new 
identity, nor verbally demand that society reconsider its significance (she chooses rather 
to enact change through action). Rather, the letter’s meaning evolves in tandem with 
Hester’s internal, subjective evolution. Remarkably, her bodily representation of identity 
remains objectively static, while subjectively transforming, in the eyes of the entire 
community, from a mark of gross sin to one of saintly self-sacrifice. Bodies are linked to 
minds, but that connection is precariously determined by society. 
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We can read Chillingworth’s rape of Dimmesdale through the same lens. 
Chillingworth’s profession as physician is ostensibly of the body, but he desires to unlock 
the adulterous secret in Dimmesdale’s mind. His strategy, then, is to try and convince 
Dimmesdale that the two are inextricably linked: “A bodily disease, which we look upon 
as whole and entire within itself, may, after all, be but a symptom of some ailment in the 
spiritual part” (119). Dimmesdale does not deny this connection, but simply refuses 
Chillingworth the privilege of examining his internal self, citing that as God’s domain. 
But Chillingworth cannot shake his fascination with this “strange sympathy betwixt soul 
and body,” which is when he uncovers the mark upon Dimmesdale’s breast (120). 
It is interesting that modern readings have been so engaged with the act of 
Chillingworth’s transgression, and less with the substance of what he discovers. Derrick 
examines in detail how Dimmesdale’s “passion” problematizes “identity by rupturing the 
borders of the body,” but he largely neglects the disruptive potential of the actual mark on 
Dimmesdale’s breast (312).24
When Chillingworth exposes Dimmesdale’s breast, Hawthorne defers explanation 
of the revelation. More boldly, he dares to defer again when Dimmesdale climactically 
 Yet this scene of passion is largely isolated, while the mark 
remains central throughout. This episode clearly links Dimmesdale’s body to his mind, 
but the full significance of that connection doesn’t manifest until he stands on the podium 
with Hester. 
                                                 
24 Derrick dismisses the mark’s significance because Chillingworth’s discovery “in no way 
clarifies the mystery of its appearance on the minister’s breast” (311). I would suggest that the 
mark’s origin story is far less interesting than its representative power as a link to 
Dimmesdale’s soul. 
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reveals his chest to the whole town. Hawthorne does offer explanations in his 
conclusions, but they are intentionally ambiguous. We get three possible answers: (1) 
Dimmesdale carved the “A” on his chest as a masochistic penance, (2) Chillingworth’s 
poisons caused it to appear, and (3) the bodily mark was a physical manifestation of 
Dimmesdale’s spiritual guilt. It would be fitting to favor the latter option; after all, such a 
fluid connection between body and mind plays perfectly into the context of this 
discussion. But Hawthorne explicitly refuses to give precedence to any one of the three 
options; instead, he positions the body as a text that is vulnerable to societal readings.25
Hester’s scarlet letter is mutable because its meaning as a physical representation 
of her internal self changes as Hester grows and the town observes her, showing how a 
 
Through the ambiguity of Dimmesdale’s “A,” Hawthorne takes the mutability of 
Hester’s mark to more profound heights. Essentially, each version of his mark represents 
distinct cultural biases. The first option is psychological. Dimmesdale indulges in archaic 
flagellation as penance for his adulterous guilt, so it should not test the reader’s 
imagination that Dimmesdale could have carved the “A” upon his breast in gothic 
solidarity with Hester. The second option channels sorcery and witchcraft, important 
subjects throughout Hawthorne’s works. The final option represents religion, spirituality 
and faith. In this context God punishes Dimmesdale for keeping his bodily sin a secret, 
manifesting his punishment not only through guilt in the mind but also visibly on the 
flesh; the mark thus physically manifests God’s call for confession. 
                                                 
25 This authorial ambiguity is a particular trademark for Hawthorne. He loved unreliable 
narrators. Indeed, in Blithedale he tells the reader on several occasions that his inferences (or 
rather Coverdale’s, as narrator) may be exaggerated or completely incorrect. Of course 
Hawthorne makes a similar apology in the Custom House introduction. 
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body’s meanings are not merely inherent, but fully determined by society’s gaze. We are 
moving decidedly toward Butler and performativity here, despite our inattention to 
gender: “Is there a ‘physical’ body prior to the perceptually perceived body? An 
impossible question to decide” (Butler 146). Yet Butler leans toward a negative answer, 
and Hawthorne suggests the same. The representative mark on Hester’s body remains 
static in actual fact, but changes dramatically by societal perception. But in Dimmesdale 
Hawthorne makes the statement even more profoundly. By offering three different 
explanations for Dimmesdale’s bodily mark, each representing different contemporary 
discourses, Hawthorne states even more radically than with Hester how the body’s 
meaning derives from discourse, not inherent fact. Such a reading reinforces Bell’s claim 
that Hawthorne “foresaw a ‘postmodern’ way of thinking that ‘reality’ is a word always 
to be set in quotation marks as part of the mind’s figuration” (19). Bodies are 
performative, not intrinsic. Thus, the act of Chillingworth’s “rape” of Dimmesdale is not 
as important as his reasons for doing it. He demands that Dimmesdale’s body is unified 
with his mind, and assaults the body to discover the secrets in his heart. But not until the 
final pages do we see Hawthorne opening up that connection, asserting that the body is 
not only defined by its inhabiting mind, but by all the members of society who view it, 
judge it, and determine its worth. 
I began this essay by suggesting that we do a disservice to nineteenth-century 
American literature by predominantly confining our readings of bodies to the paradigms 
of gender, sexuality and race. It has certainly not been my intention to suggest that these 
perspectives lack merit, but rather that Hawthorne and his contemporaries were thinking 
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and writing about bodies in ways that are not always best understood primarily through 
these lenses. Kilcup concludes her discussion of homoerotics by suggesting that The 
Scarlet Letter shows “how a text is a body and a body is a text” (21). What we often fail 
to notice is that these bodies are textual not only via modern theoretical readings, but also 
within the texts themselves as they refer to their own contemporary theories. When Miles 
Coverdale concedes that cloddish work forms cloddish thoughts, he isn’t saying anything 
about race, gender, or sexuality. However, his words imbue the body with a philosophical 
depth that interrogates Transcendentalism and societal preconceptions about the 
mind/body binary as a whole. These intentional representations of the body offer 
compelling windows into Hawthorne’s culture, and they continue to merit our attention.
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